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The extent to which consumers respond to marginal prices for medical care is important for policy.
Using recent data and a new censored quantile instrumental variable (CQIV) estimator, I estimate
the price elasticity of expenditure on medical care. The CQIV estimator allows the estimates to vary
across the skewed expenditure distribution, it allows for censoring at zero expenditure nonparametrically,
and it allows for the insurance-induced endogenous relationship between price and expenditure. For
identification, I rely on cost sharing provisions that generate marginal price differences between individuals
who have injured family members and individuals who do not. I estimate the price elasticity of expenditure
on medical care to be stable at -2.3 across the .65 to .95 conditional quantiles of the expenditure distribution.
These quantile estimates are an order of magnitude larger than previous mean estimates.  I consider
several explanations for why price responsiveness is larger than previous estimates would suggest.
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The most recent wave of cost control initiatives in medical care depends on con-
sumer responsiveness to price. The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 included
provisions to encourage price responsiveness by establishing tax-advantaged health
savings accounts as an incentive for individuals who enroll in high deductible health
insurance plans. Relative to traditional plans, high deductible health insurance plans
require consumers to face a higher marginal price for each dollar of care that they
receive. However, the eﬀects of consumer prices on medical care utilization are not
well understood.
Researchers have studied the price elasticity of expenditure on medical care for
decades, but three limitations persist: a lack of estimates that allow the price elasticity
to vary across the distribution of expenditure, a diﬃculty in handling censoring of ex-
penditures at zero, and a need for identiﬁcation strategies to overcome the insurance-
induced endogenous relationship between expenditure and price. Estimates based on
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment of the 1970’s, still widely considered to be
the standard in the literature, address the identiﬁcation issue by randomizing con-
sumers into health insurance plans with varying generosities. Although the RAND
estimates address censoring using traditional methods, there is a large and enduring
controversy over the appropriateness of the parametric assumptions that these meth-
ods require. (See Newhouse et al. (1980), Duan et al. (1983), Mullahy (1998), and
Buntin and Zaslavsky (2004).) Perhaps even more important than censoring are the
issues that arise because medical spending is so skewed. To my knowledge, none of
the existing literature allows for heterogeneity in the price elasticity of expenditure
across the expenditure distribution. In my estimation sample, drawn from a large re-
cent data set of employer-sponsored health insurance claims, just 25% of individuals
account for 94.5% of expenditures. It seems reasonable, then, that individuals with
drastically diﬀerent levels of expenditure could respond diﬀerently to price changes.
In this paper, I produce new estimates of the price elasticity of expenditure on
medical care that address heterogeneity across the expenditure distribution, censor-
ing, and identiﬁcation. I use a new censored quantile instrumental variable (CQIV)
estimator, developed speciﬁcally for this application by Chernozhukov, Fernandez-
Val, and Kowalski (2008). The CQIV estimator is particularly well-suited to address
the limitations of the literature. First, the CQIV estimator allows me to obtain es-
timates of the price elasticity of expenditure on medical care that vary across the
expenditure distribution. Relative to mean estimators, quantile estimators such as
CQIV are more robust to values in the tails of the distribution, which is particularly
2advantageous given the skewness in the distribution of medical expenditures.
Second, the CQIV estimator allows me to handle censoring without any distri-
butional assumptions. Econometrically, expenditures are censored at zero since they
cannot be negative. In my estimation sample, approximately 40% of individuals con-
sume zero medical care each year, making censoring an important econometric issue.
The parametric assumptions required by traditional censored mean estimators could
aﬀect the estimates in ways that are not straightforward. In contrast, the CQIV
estimator handles censoring nonparametrically in the tradition of Powell (1986).
Third, the CQIV estimator allows me to address endogeneity with an instrumen-
tal variable identiﬁcation strategy. In traditional health insurance policies, the price
of an additional dollar of care is a function of expenditure. Thus, observed relation-
ships between price and expenditure will be biased if they do not account for this
endogeneity.
The intuition behind my instrumental variable identiﬁcation strategy is that be-
cause of the cost-sharing provisions that govern family health insurance policies, some
individuals face lower prices for their own medical care when a family member gets
injured. This identiﬁcation strategy builds on that of Eichner (1997, 1998). As for-
malized below, the maintained assumption is that one family member’s injury can
only aﬀect another family member’s expenditure through its eﬀect on his marginal
price. Although this assumption cannot be tested directly, I take several steps to
increase its plausibility. Furthermore, in an indirect test, I ﬁnd strong evidence in
favor of the identiﬁcation assumption: in families for which cost sharing interactions
cannot occur, one family member’s injury does not appear to be related to another
family member’s medical expenditure.
My main results show that the price elasticity of expenditure on medical care is
-2.3 across the .65 to .95 quantiles of the expenditure distribution, with a point-wise
95% conﬁdence interval at the .80 quantile of -2.5 to -2.0. Although I allow the price
elasticity estimate to vary with expenditure, I ﬁnd a fairly stable elasticity across the
estimated quantiles. This estimate is an order of magnitude larger than the RAND
estimate of the mean elasticity of -0.2. Quantile estimates are not directly compa-
rable to mean estimates, but I consider several pieces of evidence that suggest that
the price elasticity of expenditure on medical care is larger than previous estimates
would suggest, particularly across the upper quantiles of the expenditure distribu-
tion. Notably, the underlying variation that I use for identiﬁcation is so pronounced
that I can illustrate it in simple ﬁgures. Furthermore, estimates based on traditional
estimators in my data are also much larger than those in the literature. I examine
3several sources of heterogeneous treatment eﬀects, but in each setting, the variation
in the estimates is small relative to the magnitude of the main estimates.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I provide background information
on the cost sharing provisions of traditional health insurance plans and formalize my
identiﬁcation strategy. In Section 3, I describe the data. In Section 4, I present
results based on CQIV and other estimators. In Section 5, I two present robustness
tests that use additional data to supplement the main estimation sample. In Section
6, I examine sources of heterogeneity in the main estimates. I conclude and discuss
directions for future research in Section 7.
2 Background
2.1 Marginal Pricing for Medical Care
Traditional employer-sponsored health insurance plans have three major cost sharing
parameters: a deductible, a coinsurance rate, and a stoploss. The “deductible” is the
amount that the consumer must pay before the insurer makes any payments. Before
reaching the deductible, the consumer pays one dollar for one dollar of care, so the
marginal price is one. After meeting the deductible, the insurer pays a fractional
amount for each dollar of care, and the consumer pays the rest. The marginal price
that the consumer pays is known as the “coinsurance rate.” After the consumer has
paid the deductible and a ﬁxed amount in coinsurance, the consumer reaches the “sto-
ploss,” and the insurer pays all expenses. For consumers that have met the stoploss,
the marginal price is zero. Figure 1 depicts how the deductible, coinsurance rate,
and stoploss induce a nonlinear relationship between the total amount paid by the
consumer and the total amount paid by the consumer plus the insurer. The consumer
faces three distinct marginal prices, the slope of each segment. The intercepts on each
axis are exact for a consumer insured as an individual with no family members, but
they can move toward the origin for a consumer insured as part of a family.
If a consumer is insured as a member of a family, the general cost sharing structure
is the same, but an additional family-level deductible and stoploss enable one family
member’s spending to aﬀect another family member’s marginal price. As a concrete
example, suppose that a plan has an individual deductible of $500, and it also has a
family deductible that is three times the individual deductible ($1,500). Each family
member must meet the individual deductible unless total family spending toward
individual deductibles exceeds the family deductible. Since the family deductible is
three times the individual deductible, if a family has fewer than four members, all
4Figure 1: Cost Sharing for Individuals
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family members must meet the individual deductible. In a family of four, when the
ﬁrst, second, and third family members go to the doctor, they each face the individual
deductible of $500, and then they pay according to the coinsurance rate, as if they
were insured as individuals. However, when the fourth family member goes to the
doctor, if the family deductible of $1,500 has been met through the fulﬁllment of three
individual $500 deductibles, he makes his ﬁrst payment at the coinsurance rate. In
families with more than four members, the family deductible is ﬁxed at $1,500, and
it can be met by any combination of payments toward individual $500 deductibles.
A similar interaction occurs at the level of the stoploss. Given the family-level cost
sharing parameters, some individuals will face lower marginal prices than their own
medical spending would dictate.
The marginal price variation induced by the family cost sharing parameters sug-
gests a simple way to study price responsiveness: compare expenditures of individuals
whose families have and have not met the family deductible. The ﬂaw with this sim-
ple identiﬁcation strategy is that individuals in families that have met the family
5deductible may be more likely to consume medical care for reasons unrelated to its
price, such as contagious illnesses or hereditary diseases. For this reason, instead of
comparing individuals according to whether or not their family members have met
the family deductible, I compare individuals according to an instrumental variable.
2.2 Identiﬁcation Strategy
To identify the eﬀect of marginal price on an individual’s medical care expenditure,
I use an instrumental variable – whether or not a family member has an injury.
The ﬁrst stage eﬀect of a family member’s injury on the individual’s marginal price
is possible in families of four or more because of the family deductible and family
stoploss described above. When one family member receives treatment for an injury,
the family is more likely to meet the family deductible than it otherwise would have
been, and any individual in the family is more likely to face a lower marginal price
than his own spending would dictate. Empirically, I ﬁnd that one family member’s
injury does indeed aﬀect another family member’s marginal price.
Given the ﬁrst stage, the key to the identiﬁcation strategy is an exclusion re-
striction: one family member’s injury cannot aﬀect another family member’s medical
spending outside of its eﬀect on his marginal price. Strictly speaking, direct viola-
tions of the exclusion restriction are not possible. Since the outcome that I study
is the medical spending of an individual in a family, and not the medical spending
of the entire family, expenditure for the treatment of one family member’s injury is
not included in the outcome variable. Furthermore, since one family member’s injury
does have a direct eﬀect on his own medical expenditure, and the injury itself likely
inﬂuences his decision to consume follow-up medical care and care for secondary ill-
nesses, I use injured family members only to construct the instrument, and I do not
include them in the estimation sample. If two or more family members are injured,
all injured family members are excluded from the estimation sample. As discussed
in Section 5, family injuries have limited persistence across years, so sample selection
issues due to the exclusion of injured parties should not be a cause for concern.
Other potential violations of the exclusion restriction involve indirect eﬀects of
one family member’s injury on another family member’s medical spending that occur
through a mechanism other than the marginal price. I include only speciﬁc injury
categories in the determination of the instrument to preclude any mechanisms that
involve physical contagion. The complete set of injury categories included in the
determination of the instrument are intracranial injuries, superﬁcial injuries (injuries
to the skin), crushing injuries, foreign body injuries, burns, and complications of
6trauma and injuries to the nerves and spinal cord. These injury categories should be
severe and unexpected enough that treatment for an injury in these categories should
not be related to an underlying family-level propensity to seek treatment, which
could lead to a violation of the exclusion restriction. Indirect tests for violations of
the exclusion restriction based on injuries in families with no possible cost-sharing
interactions, presented in Section 5, lend support to my identiﬁcation strategy.
To further avoid violations of the exclusion restriction, and also to avoid measure-
ment error, I determine the instrument only on the basis of whether an individual
was treated for an injury, and not on the basis of the spending associated with the
treatment. If the instrument included a measure of injury spending, the instrument
could be related to another family member’s medical spending through a family-level
propensity to go to expensive doctors, thus violating the exclusion restriction. Since
my instrument is only based on the treatment margin, a family-level propensity to
go to expensive doctors will not violate the exclusion restriction. However, such a
propensity could raise concerns if the price elasticity of expenditure on medical care
is not homogenous in the population.
In any instrumental variable setting, if the treatment eﬀect of interest is not ho-
mogenous in the population, the estimated eﬀect is a “local average treatment eﬀect,”
which is the average eﬀect on “compliers” who would not have received the treatment
absent the intervention of the instrument. In this setting, compliers are people who
have a family injury which causes them to face a lower price than they would have
absent the injury. Although it is not possible to identify compliers because doing so
would involve the observation of a counterfactual state in which a family member did
not get injured, Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) propose a formal methodology to
examine the average characteristics of compliers in a setting with a binary treatment
and a binary instrument. The multivalued treatment in my application precludes the
use of the Angrist et al. (1996) methodology, but I can still informally describe the
compliers as the population for which the ﬁrst stage is likely to be the strongest. For
example, the ﬁrst stage will likely be strongest among people who go to more expen-
sive doctors, because the higher the expense, the higher the likelihood of meeting the
family deductible. In addition, the ﬁrst stage will likely be strongest among accident-
prone families, because having an injury in the family is a necessary prerequisite to
being a complier. The ﬁrst stage is also likely to be strongest among large families
because large families have more people to contribute to the ﬁxed family deductible.
Furthermore, the ﬁrst stage is likely to be strongest among individuals that have a
family injury that occurs early in the year. One limitation of my approach is that it is
7static in the sense that I do not explicitly model intra-year timing issues. However, the
instrumental variables framework automatically allows for some dynamics. Consider
the case of an injury that occurs on December 31. Such an injury many initially
seem problematic for my strategy because it is unlikely that family expenditure can
respond to such an injury before the end of the year. However, it is also unlikely
that the family member’s marginal price can respond to such an injury before the
end of the year. Thus, the minimal expenditure eﬀect will be scaled by the minimal
price eﬀect, therefore taking the intra-year timing of the injury into account. Stated
more explicitly, my approach only requires that there is time for the expenditure to
respond if there time for marginal price to respond.
3 Data
3.1 Data Description
I use recent proprietary data from a US ﬁrm with over 500,000 insured employees.
The data for my analysis are merged together from several databases compiled and
distributed by Medstat (2003). In my merged data set, in addition to observing
inpatient, outpatient, and prescription drug claims, I also observe characteristics of
the oﬀered plans and associated enrollment characteristics. The Medstat claims data
are particularly well-suited to my analysis because the medical claims data identify
the beneﬁciary and insurer contributions on each claim. Because beneﬁciaries must
submit claims to receive reimbursement, and because the ﬁrms that pay the claims
collect the data, incentives are aligned to ensure the accuracy and completeness of
the claims data.
A major advantage of the Medstat data over stand alone claims data is that if
beneﬁciaries do not ﬁle any claims or discontinue enrollment, I can still verify their
coverage and observe their demographic characteristics in the enrollment database.
These data represent an advantage over Eichner (1997, 1998). Although I predom-
inantly use cross-sectional variation in the data, I can track individuals and their
covered family members over time as long as the subscriber remains at the same
ﬁrm. One limitation of the Medstat data is that I do not observe employees or family
members who are not covered, and I do not observe health insurance options available
outside the ﬁrm. However, according to the 2006 Kaiser Annual Survey of Employer
Health Beneﬁts, 82% of eligible workers enroll in plans oﬀered by their employers, so
I should observe a large majority of workers at the ﬁrm that I study.
I focus on data from one ﬁrm to isolate marginal price variation from other factors
8that could vary by ﬁrm and plan. This ﬁrm is in the retail trade industry. The main
advantage of the ﬁrm I that I study is that the four plans that it oﬀered in 2003 and
2004 varied only in the deductible and stoploss. Furthermore, one of the oﬀered plans
has a $1,000 deductible, which is coincidentally the initial qualifying amount for a
plan to be considered “high deductible” by 2003 legislation. Plan selection issues
should not invalidate my identiﬁcation strategy because it relies on within-plan price
variation. However, plan-related local average treatment eﬀects are possible, and I
investigate them by comparing behavior across plans.
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Table 1 presents a comparison of the cost sharing parameters across plans. The
individual deductibles vary from $350 to $1,000, and the family deductible is always
three times the individual deductible, as in the example described above. Net of
deductibles, the family stoplosses are always twice as large as the individual stoplosses.
The simple cost sharing parameters introduced above provide a very accurate
description of the marginal prices that consumers face at this ﬁrm. Almost all covered
medical spending counts toward the deductible and stoploss, except for spending
9on prescription drugs, which I do not include in my analysis because it is covered
separately. Unlike in many medical plans, there is no ﬁxed per-visit payment.
The only complication in the cost sharing structure at the ﬁrm that I study is
that the plans oﬀer incentives for beneﬁciaries to go to providers that are part of a
network. All four plans are preferred provider organization (PPO) plans. According
to the Kaiser 2006 Annual Survey of Employer Health Beneﬁts, 60% of workers with
employer-sponsored health insurance are covered by PPO plans. PPO plans do not
require a primary care physician or a referral for services, and there are no capitated
physician reimbursements. However, there is an incentive to visit providers in the
network because there is a higher coinsurance rate for expenses outside of the network.
In the ﬁrm that I study, the general coinsurance rate is 20%, and the out-of-network
coinsurance rate is 40%. The network itself does not vary across plans. In the data,
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Empirical Cost Sharing for Individuals
there are no identiﬁers for out-of-network expenses, but, as demonstrated by Figure
2, which plots beneﬁciary expenses on total expenses for a sample of individuals,
beneﬁciary expenses follow the in-network schedule with a high degree of accuracy,
indicating that out-of-network expenses are very rare. Accordingly, in my analysis,
10I assume that everyone who has met the deductible faces the in-network marginal
price for care. My main results do not change when I exclude the small number of
beneﬁciaries whose out-of-pocket payments deviate from the in-network schedule.
3.2 Sample Selection
Although selection into the ﬁrm that I study could be a cause for concern, the ﬁrm
has employees in every region of the United States, and it is large enough that id-
iosyncratic medical usage should not be a problem. With over 800,000 people covered
by the plans oﬀered by this ﬁrm, this ﬁrm is large, even among other large ﬁrms in the
Medstat data. Furthermore, all of the component Medstat databases are available for
this ﬁrm for 2003 and 2004, so I can check for internal consistency by comparing re-
sults across both cross-sections. Beginning in the 2003 data, the Medstat data include
ﬁelds that make the determination of marginal price and continuous enrollment very
accurate. Since these data are so recent, they should provide an accurate description
of current health insurance oﬀerings and usage. Because the covered population con-
sists of active, non-union employees in the retail trade industry, my ﬁndings should
have widespread external validity.
Within the ﬁrm, the main selection criterion that I apply is a continuous enroll-
ment restriction. Since my outcome of interest is year-end expenditure, and family
members play a role in the determination of the instrument, I only include individuals
in my sample if their entire families, with the exception of newborns, are enrolled for
the entire plan year. I retain families with newborns on the grounds that child birth
is an important medical expense. Care before death is also an important medical ex-
pense, but I cannot make an exception for individuals who die because I only observe
in-hospital deaths, and there are none recorded in the unselected sample. In my main
results, which use the 2004 and 2003 data as separate cross-sections, I require that
the family is enrolled from January 1 to December 31 of the given year. Selection due
to the continuous enrollment restriction eliminates over 30% of the original sample
in each year. Analysis of other ﬁrms in the Medstat data suggests that the rate of
turnover at this ﬁrm is comparable to the rate of turnover at other large ﬁrms.
Through selection based on the detailed ﬁelds in the Medstat data, I can be
conﬁdent that my selected sample consists of accurate records. Since families are
important to my analysis, I perform all selection steps at the family level. I eliminate
families that switch plans, families that have changes in observable covariates over
the course of the year, and families that have demographic information that is in-
consistent between enrollment and claims information. I also eliminate families that
11have unresolved payment adjustments. Statistics on each step of the sample selection
are available in a supplemental data appendix. Taken together, these steps eliminate
less than seven percent of individuals from the continuously enrolled sample.
In this clean sample, just over 25% of employees with other insured family mem-
bers are insured in families of four or more. The 2004 main estimation sample includes
127,119 individuals from 29,010 families of four or more. Although the stoploss in-
duces some intra-family interactions in marginal price in families of three, I restrict
the estimation sample to families of four or more so that deductible interactions
are also possible. In a robustness test, I examine employee-spouse couples precisely
because price interactions are not possible.
To better control for unobservables, I limit my estimation sample to the employee
in each family, and I use other family members only in the determination of the
instrument. In some speciﬁcations, I also include individuals identiﬁed as spouses
in the estimation sample. Restricting the sample to employees or employees and
spouses sacriﬁces power because it does not take the price responsiveness of all family
members into account, but it arguably provides the best control for unobservables
on the grounds that employees at the same ﬁrm have some common characteristics
that they do not necessarily share with the spouses and children of their co-workers.
Moreover, restricting the sample to employees eliminates the need to address possible
correlations in price responsiveness among family members.
3.3 Summary Statistics
In the 2004 sample, mean year-end medical expenditure by the beneﬁciary and the
insurer is $1,485 in the sample of employees and $1,135 in the sample that also includes
spouses and dependents. However, the mean is not a very informative summary
statistic for medical expenditures because many people consume zero care, and the
distribution of medical spending among those who do consume care traditionally has
a long right tail. As mentioned above, in my full sample, almost 40% of people
consume zero care in the entire year, and people in the top 25% of the expenditure
distribution are responsible for 94.5% of expenditures. Given this skewness, I analyze
the logarithm of expenditure instead of the level.
The ﬁrst panel of Table 2 summarizes the expenditure distribution across bins
that follow a logarithmic scale. As shown in the ﬁrst column, excluding individu-
als with zero expenditure, the distribution of positive expenditure among employees
follows an approximately lognormal distribution, with 31.1% of individuals in the
expenditure range between $100 and $1,000, and smaller percentages of individuals
12Table 2: 2004 Summary Statistics
2004 Summary Statistics
Cells report column % by variable
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Year-end Expenditure ($)
0 35.7 39.9 36.6 29.8 40.9 32.3 24.2
.01 to 100.00 11.0 12.2 11.0 10.9 12.3 11.4 7.9
100.01 to 1,000 31.1 31.4 30.8 32.8 30.9 35.0 33.8
1,000.01 to 10,000 19.0 14.4 18.5 22.1 13.8 18.2 27.6
10,000.01 to 100,000 3.2 2.1 3.0 4.5 2.0 3.0 6.4
100,000.01 and up 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
B. Year-end Price
0 3.9 3.1 3.5 6.8 2.7 6.1 6.7
0.2 38.8 32.8 37.2 49.1 30.9 46.0 47.2
1 57.3 64.1 59.3 44.1 66.4 48.0 46.1
C. Family Injury
0 (NO Family Injury) 86.6 87.4 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 96.1
1 (Family Injury) 13.4 12.6 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 3.9
D. Family Size
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 66.9 60.2 68.2 58.2 61.7 49.6 0.0
5 24.4 27.5 23.8 28.5 26.9 31.6 0.0
6 6.6 8.8 6.1 9.6 8.3 12.5 0.0
7 1.6 2.5 1.4 2.8 2.3 4.3 0.0
8 to 11 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.9 0.9 1.9 0.0
E. Relation to Employee
Employee 100.0 22.8 100.0 100.0 22.6 24.3 100.0
Spouse 0.0 19.0 0.0 0.0 18.9 19.8 0.0
Child/Other 0.0 58.2 0.0 0.0 58.5 55.9 0.0
F. Male
0 (Female) 42.6 49.9 42.7 41.9 49.9 50.2 60.2
1 (Male) 57.4 50.1 57.3 58.1 50.1 49.8 39.8
G. Year of Birth
1934 to 1943 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 10.9
1944 to 1953 4.0 1.8 4.1 3.2 1.8 1.5 44.3
1954 to 1963 30.9 12.9 31.1 29.7 12.9 12.8 26.5
1964 to 1973 51.8 20.8 51.5 53.7 20.5 22.7 10.6
1974 to 1983 13.2 7.0 13.2 13.2 6.9 7.6 7.6
1984 to 1993 0.0 27.9 0.0 0.1 28.0 27.1 0.1
1994 to 1998 0.0 16.0 0.0 0.0 16.1 15.4 0.0
1999 to 2004 0.0 13.5 0.0 0.0 13.6 12.8 0.0
H. Employee Class
Salary Non-union 29.9 30.2 29.9 30.4 30.2 30.0 10.3
Hourly Non-union 70.1 69.8 70.1 69.6 69.8 70.0 89.7
I. US Census Region
New England 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.6
Middle Atlantic 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.7
East North Central 15.6 15.7 15.8 14.5 15.8 15.1 14.2
West North Central 11.9 12.0 11.8 12.2 12.0 12.0 11.1
South Atlantic 19.0 18.9 19.3 16.9 19.2 17.2 23.7
East South Central 11.6 11.3 11.2 14.4 11.0 13.7 13.9
West South Central 28.3 28.3 28.4 27.4 28.5 27.3 24.5
Mountain 7.5 7.6 7.3 8.4 7.5 8.3 6.3
Pacific 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.4 3.1 3.5 2.9
J. Plan by Individual Deductible
350 59.8 59.9 58.7 67.2 58.7 67.8 67.1
500 17.0 16.9 17.3 15.6 17.2 15.2 15.4
750 6.3 6.3 6.6 4.8 6.5 4.7 5.3
1000 16.8 16.9 17.5 12.4 17.6 12.3 12.2
Sample Size 29,010 127,119 25,124 3,886 111,124 15,995 37,490
Everyone Employees
Families of Four or More
in the bins above and below this range. The distribution of expenditures in the full
sample, summarized in the second column, is similar. Table A1 presents analogous
summary statistics for the 2003 samples. In a previous version of this paper, Kowalski
13(2008), I report a comparison of the skewness between my sample and the nationally-
representative 2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). On a percentage
basis, the skewness in my sample is relatively comparable to the skewness in the
MEPS, but my sample has a slightly more concentrated right tail.
The second panel in Table 2 depicts the distribution of the endogenous variable,
the marginal price for the next dollar of care at the end of the year. I calculate the
marginal price to reﬂect the spending of the individual and his family members. If the
individual has not consumed any care and the family deductible has not been met,
the marginal price takes on a value of one because the individual still needs to meet
the deductible. In the employee sample, 57.3% of beneﬁciaries face a marginal price
of one, 38.3% of employees face the coinsurance rate of 0.2, and 3.9% of employees
have met the stoploss and face a marginal price of zero. This price variation should
be large enough to be meaningful.
The distribution of the instrument, “family injury,” shows that 13.4% of employees
have at least one family member who is injured in the course of the year. Since
injured employees are excluded from the sample, all of the injuries included in the
determination of the instrument in the employee sample are to spouses and other
dependents. In the full sample, injuries to employees are included in the determination
of the instrument, and the same injury can be reﬂected as a “family injury” for more
than one person. Overall, 12.6% of individuals in the full sample have an injury in
the family.
Even though injured people are excluded from all estimation samples, I report
statistics on the injured people in Table 3. If a person has any claim for an injury
with an ICD-9 code in one of the listed categories, he is included in the count in
the ﬁrst column. Complications of trauma and injuries to the nerves and spinal
cord are the most prominent. The distribution of injuries across 2003 and 2004 is
remarkably stable, which could indicate that the ﬁrm is large enough that injuries are
not idiosyncratic. In the second column, I report the mean year-end total expenditures
for the injured people to demonstrate that their spending should be large enough to
have a meaningful eﬀect on the price that their family members face. The last three
columns of Table 3 show the number of aﬀected family members in each estimation
sample by injury category.
Panels D through J of Table 2 summarize the distribution of covariates. Family
size varies from four to eleven, with 60.2% of people in families of four. The full
sample is gender balanced, but 57.4% of employees are male. All employees are
between the ages of 20 and 65 in 2004. The distribution of “year of birth” is bimodal
14Table 3: Individuals with Injuries and Their Families













Intracranial Injuries 331 $9,873.39 1,049 480 272
Superficial Injuries 1,276 $2,447.52 4,172 1,846 1,014
Crushing Injuries 59 $2,296.21 196 83 46
Foreign Body Injuries 536 $2,591.30 1,764 805 443
Burns 238 $3,146.49 819 336 189
Complications of Trauma 
and Injuries to the Nerves 
and Spinal Cord
3,241 $4,639.26 10,069 4,451 2,462
All Injuries 5,249 $3,871.19 15,995 7,052 3,886
No Injury 127,119 $1,134.83 111,124 46,133 25,124
Everyone 132,368 $1,243.34 127,119 53,185 29,010
2003 Sample
Intracranial Injuries 293 $11,134.06 1,004 465 249
Superficial Injuries 1,178 $2,291.38 3,857 1,702 927
Crushing Injuries 62 $5,937.69 197 92 50
Foreign Body Injuries 462 $2,516.10 1,541 685 390
Burns 250 $8,873.55 868 354 205
Complications of Trauma 
and Injuries to the Nerves 
and Spinal Cord
3,168 $4,125.15 9,809 4,300 2,328
All Injuries 5,031 $3,789.94 15,422 6,761 3,685
No Injury 131,815 $1,038.19 116,393 47,922 26,201
Everyone 136,846 $1,139.36 131,815 54,683 29,886
Note: Categories of injuries shown need not be mutually exclusive.
Statistics on non-injured people in family exclude people with ANY type of injury shown.
Injured Individuals
(Excluded from Estimation Sample) (Estimation Sample)
Non-Injured Individuals in Family
because the sample includes parents and their children. Panel H shows that 70.1%
of the employees are salaried, and the remaining employees are hourly. One of the
limitations of the Medstat data is that it does not include any income measures, but
the salaried vs. hourly classiﬁcation could serve as a crude proxy. I also investigate
potential income eﬀects in other ways, discussed below. The distribution of the sample
by Census region demonstrates that the ﬁrm has a very national reach. The largest
concentration of employees is in the West South Central Census region, where 28.3%
of the sample resides.
The ﬁnal panel depicts the distribution of employees and families across the four
plans. Each plan has a unique individual deductible, which I use as the plan identiﬁer.
15A comparison of the plan distribution between the employee sample and the full
sample shows that larger families do not select diﬀerentially into plans. Almost 60%
of employees and families are enrolled in the most generous plan, which has a $350
deductible. Since this plan is the most popular, and since the low deductible makes
the people in this plan the most likely to experience a price change for a ﬁxed amount
of spending, it is likely that the behavior of the people in this plan has a substantial
inﬂuence on my results. Indeed, I ﬁnd that the ﬁrst stage coeﬃcient is the largest




The raw variation in the data that drives my instrumental variable approach is so
pronounced that it can be discerned graphically, without the assistance of complex
estimators. In instrumental variable parlance, the eﬀect of family injury on expendi-
ture is the “reduced form,” and the eﬀect of family injury on the year-end price is the
“ﬁrst stage.” The simple instrumental variable estimate is the ratio of the reduced
form to the ﬁrst stage. To show the variation that drives the instrumental variable
strategy, I present graphical depictions of the reduced form and the ﬁrst stage in the
2004 sample of employees.
To demonstrate the reduced form, in the top panel of Figure 3, I present the
cumulative distribution (cdf) of expenditure conditional on family injury. The cdf
of expenditure for employees with no family injury is represented by a solid line,
and the cdf of expenditure for employees with a family injury is represented by a
dashed line. In this depiction, each quantile on the y axis is associated with a value
of the logarithm of expenditure on the x axis. Median expenditure is $120 among
employees with no family injuries and $203 among employees with family injuries.
Since the lines never cross, it is clear from the ﬁgure that employees with family
injuries have higher expenditures at all quantiles. Similarity in the curvature of
the two cdfs provides reassurance that not all individuals with family injuries have
extremely high expenditures, thus driving the results. The y intercepts of each line
indicate that family injuries aﬀect the extensive margin decision of whether or not
to consume any care; only 30% of people with family injuries consume zero care, as
opposed to 37% of people with no family injuries. To examine whether the diﬀerence
between the lines at all quantiles is driven by eﬀects on the extensive margin, I create





a similar ﬁgure, not shown here, that depicts cumulative distributions conditional
on positive expenditure. The lines of the new ﬁgure do not cross, indicating that
even among employees with positive expenditure, employees with family injuries have
higher expenditure at each quantile. Columns 3-4 of Table 2 present the underlying
conditional probability density functions in tabular form.
To demonstrate the ﬁrst stage eﬀect of family injury on the year-end price, in
the bottom panel of Figure 3, I present the cumulative distribution of year-end price
conditional on family injury. Since the year-end price takes on only three values, the
cdf is a step function, but I connect the points of the step function with straight lines
to aid in the visual interpretation. The lines in this ﬁgure do not cross, indicating
that employees with family injuries are more likely to face lower prices than their
counterparts without family injuries. Labels on the y axis show that 56% of employees
17with family injuries spend more than the deductible, while only 41% of employees
without family injuries spend more than the deductible. Similarly, 6.8% of employees
with family injuries spend more than the stoploss, while only 3.5% of employees
without family injuries spend more than the stoploss.
The depiction in the bottom panel also allows us to assess which price change,
the change from 1 to 0.2 or the change from 0.2 to 0, yields the most identiﬁcation.
Following Angrist and Imbens (1995), the vertical diﬀerence between the cdf’s at the
new price is proportional to the weight in an instrumental variable estimate formed
from a weighted combination of separate Wald estimates for each price change. Since
the diﬀerence in the cdf’s is largest at the price of 0.2, the ﬁgure indicates that most
identiﬁcation comes from the price change between 1 and 0.2, and some identiﬁcation
comes from the price change between 0.2 and 0.
As a more formal alternative to the bottom panel of Figure 3, a simple ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression of year-end price on family injury and a set of covariates
discussed below indicates that having an injury in the family decreases the year-end
price by 11 percentage points, with a standard error of .7 percentage points. The
R-squared of this ﬁrst stage regression with the covariates partialled out is 0.0096,
implying a concentration parameter (deﬁned as NR2/(1−R2)) of 281. Based on this
evidence, “weak instruments bias” is unlikely to be a problem in this application.
The inclusion of control variables should not have a substantial impact on the
estimate, but should merely make it more precise. One way to assess the importance
of control variables to the instrumental variable strategy is to examine the distribution
of each variable conditional on the values of the instrument. Ideally, in this setting,
individuals who have any injured family member would be similar in all observable
ways to those who do not have an injured family member.
Panels D through J of columns 3-4 and 5-6 of Table 2 give the distribution of
covariates conditional on family injury. The distribution of family size shows that
individuals in larger families are slightly more likely to have injuries in their families,
as is to be expected if the incidence of injures is distributed evenly across individuals.
Given this discrepancy, I include ﬂexible controls for family structure in my formal
estimates. Speciﬁcally, I include a dummy for the presence of a spouse on the policy,
the year of birth of the oldest and youngest dependent, and the count of family
members born in each of the year ranges in the table, with the 1999-2004 range
saturated by year. In the remaining panels of Table 2, the distribution of the other
control variables appears much less sensitive to the instrument. I control for them in
my formal estimates because complex interactions between these variables might not
18be visible in the table.
4.2 CQIV Model and Estimation






∗ = Q(lnE)∗(U|P,W,V ) (1b)
P = φ(V,W,Z) (1c)
where lnE, is the logarithm of observed year-end medical expenditure, and T(x) ≡
max(x,C) is the transformation function that censors the unobserved uncensored
value of (lnEi)∗ at C, where C is lower than the smallest nonzero value of ln E. P
is the year-end marginal price of medical care, W are covariates described above, Z
is an indicator for family injury (the instrumental variable), V is a latent unobserved
regressor called the “control function,” and U is a Skorohod disturbance that satisﬁes
the independence assumption
U v U(0,1)|P,W,C,V.
This independence assumption is stronger than the mean independence assump-
tion required by models of the conditional mean, but it should be plausible given
the discussion in Section 2.2. It reﬂects the exclusion restriction that one family
member’s injury cannot aﬀect another family member’s expenditure outside of its
eﬀect on marginal price. The quantiles of any distribution always follow a uniform
distribution, so the uniform distribution is completely general and is not a parametric
assumption of the model.
For computational eﬃciency, I estimate a linear model. The functional form of
the model that I estimate is very ﬂexible, in that it allows for random coeﬃcients
that vary with the quantiles of the expenditure distribution:
(lnE)
∗ = α(U)P + W
0β(U) + γ(U)V
= X
0β(U), X = (P,V,W)
where α(U) are the random coeﬃcients of interest.
19As in traditional models, we can interact the marginal price variable with an ob-
served covariate to examine heterogeneity in price responsiveness along an observed
dimension. The quantile model also allows us to examine heterogeneity in price re-
sponsiveness along the unobserved dimension U. In what follows, I maintain the
agnostic interpretation that the coeﬃcients are a function of the quantiles of unob-
served heterogeneity. For stronger interpretations, we can make assumptions about
the heterogeneity represented by U. For example, in this application, income is not
observed, and if we assume that income is the only dimension of unobserved het-
erogeneity, the estimated coeﬃcients will allow us to examine price responsiveness
at varying quantiles of the income distribution. Alternatively, U could represent
the quantiles of unobserved health or hypochondria. If unobserved heterogeneity is
one dimensional and the quantiles of unobserved heterogeneity are the same as the
quantiles of the expenditure distribution conditional on covariates, the estimated co-
eﬃcients at the highest quantiles will yield price responsiveness for individuals who
spend the most.
I estimate this model using the censored quantile instrumental variable (CQIV)
estimator, developed in detail in Chernozkukov, Fernandez-Val, and Kowalski (2008).
Here, I provide more intuition for the advantages of the CQIV estimator relative to
other models, and I provide practical implementation details. I have already shown
that the CQIV model allows the coeﬃcients to vary with the quantiles of interest. In
addition, CQIV handles censoring nonparametrically, and it allows for endogeneity.
Censoring induces attenuation bias in quantile regression much in the same way it
induces bias in mean regression: when C is observed in the place of a value that should
be much smaller, a line that ﬁts the observed values will be biased toward zero. Since
quantile regression uses information from the entire sample to generate the estimate at
each quantile, if some observations on lnE are censored, the quantile regression lines
can be biased toward zero at all quantiles. The Powell (1984) estimator overcomes







where ρτ(u) = {(1 − τ)1(u < 0) + τ1(u > 0)}|u|. Despite its theoretical appeal,
this model is rarely used in practice because the function T(x) induces nonconvexities
in the objective function that present computational diﬃculties.
Chernozhukov and Hong (2002) devised a tractable computational censored quan-
tile regression (CQR) algorithm for Powell’s estimator based on the idea that Powell’s
20censored regression model estimates the coeﬃcients using observations that are not
likely to be censored. The algorithm is a three-step procedure that predicts which
observations are least likely to be censored and estimates the coeﬃcients based on
those observations. The ﬁrst step involves a parametric prediction of the probability
of censoring based on a probit or logit model. A set fraction of observations that are
unlikely to be censored are retained for estimation via quantile regression in the sec-
ond step. After the second step, a larger set of observations is retained based on the
predicted values of the dependent variable. This sample gets asymptotically close to
the ideal sample of non-censored observations, and consistent estimates are obtained
through a third step of quantile regressionon this sample. The CQIV computational
algorithm uses an analog of the Chernozhukov and Hong (2002) algorithm to handle
censoring, with an additional pre-step to handle endogeneity.
The CQIV estimator uses a control function approach to handle endogeneity in
the tradition of Hausman (1978). The control function approach is based on the ob-
servation that endogeneity between the price variable P and the expenditure variable
(lnE)∗ results in a lack of orthogonality between P and the structural disturbance
U. Given this lack of orthogonality, estimates based only on Equation (1b) would
be inconsistent. However, if Z is orthogonal to U conditional on covariates W, then
the structural disturbance U is a function of the ﬁrst stage disturbance V as follows:
E(U|V ) = δV + η. By construction, E(η|V ) = 0. Therefore, when b V is included
along with P in Equation (1b), the new structural error term is mean independent
of the price variable P. The conditions for strict independence can be derived simi-
larly. The estimated ﬁrst stage error term b V is referred to as the estimated “control
function,” because it “controls” for endogeneity in the structural equation.
One advantage of the control function approach to endogeneity, in contrast to
the moment condition approach to endogeneity used by Chernozhkov and Hansen
(2008) in their quantile instrumental variable estimator, is that the control function
approach does not require a rank invariance condition on the structural equation.
However, one disadvantage is that the assumptions necessary for the control function
approach are less likely to be satisﬁed when the endogenous variable is discrete, as it is
in this application. In practice, however, estimates based on a variation on the CQIV
estimator that uses a Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) moment condition approach
to endogeneity, reported in Kowalski (2008), are almost identical to those presented
here to the number of reported decimal places.
In the reported estimates, I follow the standard practice of obtaining an estimate of
the control term by predicting the OLS residuals from the ﬁrst stage equation. I obtain
2195% conﬁdence intervals on the coeﬃcients via bootstrapping. In practice, I report the
mean of the conﬁdence interval as the point estimate because the discreteness of the
covariates can hinder convergence of the quantile estimator at speciﬁc combinations
of covariates.
4.3 Main Results
Since so many individuals have zero expenditure, there is not enough empirical ex-
penditure and price variation to obtain precise estimates below the .65 quantile of the
expenditure distribution in my data. At conditional quantiles where zero expenditure
is likely, the marginal price can have an eﬀect on two margins - the decision to spend
anything at all, and the decision to change spending conditional on spending a posi-
tive amount. If changes in price and other factors are not suﬃcient to induce people
to visit the doctor at all, it is not possible to estimate the eﬀect of small changes in
price. With approximately 40% censoring in the data, it seems reasonable that CQIV
coeﬃcients are not reliable at the median. Estimates can be obtained below the .65
quantile, but they are not very precise.
For the .65 quantile and above, Table 4 reports the coeﬃcient on year-end price
and the associated lower and upper bounds of the 95% conﬁdence interval. Year-end
price is not speciﬁed in logarithmic form because it can take on a value of zero. Thus,
the estimated coeﬃcient must be transformed into an elasticity estimate. I transform








I use an arc elasticity instead of a point elasticity because, as discussed above,
identiﬁcation comes mainly from the large price drop from 1 to 0.2. Speciﬁcally, as
a function of the estimated coeﬃcient b α at each quantile, and the prices of interest,
the transformation that I use is as follows:
b η =








This formula yields the “price elasticity of expenditure.” By subtracting one from
the expenditure elasticity, I could arrive at the price elasticity of demand for medical
care. However, since the literature generally reports expenditure elasticities, I re-
port expenditure elasticities in brackets under each coeﬃcient. The upper and lower
bounds of the bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence interval can be transformed similarly.
22Table 4: 2004 and 2003 CQIV Year-End Price Coeﬃcients
2004 and 2003 CQIV Year-End Price Coefficients
Dependent variable:  Ln(Expenditure)
2004 Sample 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 Tobit IV
A. Employee
N= 29,010 Year-end price -4.34 -4.27 -4.46 -4.52 -4.62 -4.72 -4.58 -6.36
     lower bound -5.15 -5.11 -5.16 -5.06 -5.21 -5.27 -4.98 -7.42
     upper bound -3.30 -3.54 -3.59 -3.95 -4.03 -4.21 -4.17 -5.30
     [Elasticity] -[2.17] -[2.14] -[2.23] -[2.26] -[2.31] -[2.36] -[2.29] -[3.18]
B. Employee and Spouse
N= 53,185 Year-end price -4.71 -4.69 -4.66 -4.57 -4.51 -4.66 -4.48 -6.57
     lower bound -5.43 -5.20 -5.10 -5.03 -4.92 -5.01 -4.77 -7.29
     upper bound -3.93 -4.05 -4.13 -4.10 -4.09 -4.37 -4.12 -5.86
     [Elasticity] -[2.35] -[2.35] -[2.33] -[2.29] -[2.25] -[2.33] -[2.24] -[3.29]
C. Everyone
N= 127,119 Year-end price -4.03 -3.96 -3.96 -3.92 -3.99 -4.08 -4.13 -6.78
     lower bound -4.35 -4.23 -4.22 -4.16 -4.24 -4.28 -4.31 -7.28
     upper bound -3.67 -3.66 -3.74 -3.67 -3.71 -3.86 -3.92 -6.29
     [Elasticity] -[2.01] -[1.98] -[1.98] -[1.96] -[2.00] -[2.04] -[2.06] -[3.39]
2003 Sample
D. Employee
N= 29,886 Year-end price -5.02 -4.87 -4.63 -4.33 -4.34 -4.32 -4.43 -7.55
     lower bound -5.89 -5.49 -5.22 -5.09 -4.90 -4.92 -4.96 -8.56
     upper bound -4.24 -4.11 -3.96 -3.66 -3.87 -3.81 -3.98 -6.54
     [Elasticity] -[2.51] -[2.43] -[2.32] -[2.17] -[2.17] -[2.16] -[2.22] -[3.77]
E. Employee and Spouse
N= 54,683 Year-end price -5.53 -5.16 -4.81 -4.51 -4.42 -4.42 -4.53 -7.83
     lower bound -6.20 -5.72 -5.38 -4.92 -4.81 -4.75 -4.88 -8.56
     upper bound -4.89 -4.57 -4.38 -4.10 -4.05 -4.06 -4.19 -7.10
     [Elasticity] -[2.76] -[2.58] -[2.40] -[2.26] -[2.21] -[2.21] -[2.26] -[3.91]
F. Everyone
N= 131,815 Year-end price -4.72 -4.43 -4.24 -4.19 -4.12 -4.08 -4.14 -7.75
     lower bound -5.12 -4.73 -4.61 -4.49 -4.44 -4.30 -4.39 -8.28
     upper bound -4.35 -4.08 -3.89 -3.85 -3.89 -3.88 -3.92 -7.21
     [Elasticity] -[2.36] -[2.21] -[2.12] -[2.09] -[2.06] -[2.04] -[2.07] -[3.87]
Lower and upper bounds of 95% confidence interval from 200 bootstrap replications.
Lower and upper bounds for specifications B, C, E, and F account for intra-family correlations.
Controls include: employee dummy (when applicable), spouse dummy (when applicable), male 
dummy, plan (saturated), census region (saturated), salary dummy (vs. hourly), spouse on policy 
dummy, YOB of oldest dependent, YOB of youngest dependent, family size (saturated with 8-11 
as one group), count family born 1944 to 1953, count family born 1954 to 1963, count family born 
1974 to 1983, count family born 1984 to 1993, count family born 1994 to 1998, count family born 
1999, count family born 2000, count family born 2001, count family born 2002, count family born 
2003, count family born 2004 (when applicable).
Censored Quantile IV
In all of the estimated quantiles, the CQIV expenditure elasticities are an order of
magnitude larger than those in the literature. For example, at the .85 quantile of the
expenditure distribution, the implied expenditure elasticity is -2.3, which indicates
that a one percent increase in price would decrease spending at the .85 quantile of
the expenditure distribution by 2.3 percent. This elasticity estimate is fairly stable
23across the quantiles from .65 to .95, indicating that price responsiveness, though
strong, does not tend to vary widely among people in the highest quantiles of the
expenditure distribution. Estimates at quantiles between the reported quantiles are
similar.
Speciﬁcations B and C in Table 4 present coeﬃcients estimated on samples that
include spouses and other dependents in each family. The patterns in the estimates
across the quantiles are very similar to those in the employee sample, but the es-
timates are slightly more precise given the larger sample sizes, even with reported
bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals that account for intra-family correlations. The
elasticities estimated on the 2003 sample, presented in the bottom panels of Table 4,
show remarkably similar patterns. The similarity of the estimates between 2003 and
2004 provides some evidence of robustness, and it suggests that price responsiveness
did not change between 2003 and 2004. Even though price responsiveness does not
tend to vary across the estimated quantiles, as reported in Table A2, coeﬃcients on
some covariates have plausible signs but vary dramatically, indicating that a random
coeﬃcients model is appropriate in this application.
4.4 Comparison With Other Estimators
For comparison with previous literature, I compare my CQIV estimates to mean es-
timates. However, quantile estimators and mean estimators are not likely to yield
the same point estimates because they do not estimate the same quantities. Quan-
tile estimates and mean estimates are only similar to the extent that the underlying
treatment eﬀect is linear and the error distribution is symmetric and homoskedastic.
In this application, CQIV estimates are particularly likely to be diﬀerent from esti-
mates obtained with mean estimators because medical expenditures are skewed and
censored. Compared to mean estimates, CQIV estimates are less sensitive to extreme
values, and they are not based on parametric assumptions about censoring.
One of the most popular censored estimators, the Tobit estimator, developed
by Tobin (1958), is based on the parametric assumption that the error term is ho-
moskedastic and normally distributed. The Tobit IV estimator, developed by Newey
(1987) provides a good comparison to the CQIV estimator because it incorporates
endogeneity. Eichner (1997, 1998) used a version of the Tobit IV estimator. Rel-
ative to the Tobit estimator, the Tobit IV estimator requires additional parametric
assumptions: a homoskedasticity assumption on the ﬁrst stage error term and a joint
normality distributional assumption on the structural and ﬁrst stage error terms. In
this application, it is unlikely that the Tobit IV assumption of homoskedasticity in the
24structural equation holds given the discreteness of the endogenous variable, year-end
price.
A Hausman (1978) joint test of the Tobit IV normality and homoskedasticity as-
sumptions can be conducted through comparison of the Tobit IV and CQIV estimates
at each quantile. Under the null hypothesis, these conditions hold, and Tobit IV is
consistent and eﬃcient, and CQIV is consistent. Although it would be intuitive to
compare the Tobit IV estimate, which is an estimate of the mean elasticity, to a CQIV
median elasticity estimate, a median estimate is not necessary for the comparison.
Since Tobit IV imposes a constant treatment eﬀect across all quantiles, the single To-
bit IV coeﬃcient can be compared directly to the CQIV coeﬃcients at each quantile.
The last column of Table 4 presents Tobit IV coeﬃcients. In all speciﬁcations, the
estimated Tobit IV coeﬃcient is more negative than all of the quantile coeﬃcients,
and the 95% conﬁdence intervals barely overlap, indicating a rejection of the null
hypothesis that the assumptions required by Tobit IV hold.
It should be noted that the Tobit IV coeﬃcients imply an even larger elasticity
than the CQIV coeﬃcients, indicating that the use of the CQIV estimator alone does
not explain the large size of my estimates relative to other estimates in the literature.
For comparative purposes, I also estimate instrumental variable adaptations of two
other common censored mean estimators: a truncated model and a two-part model.
The truncated elasticity estimate is -0.8, and the two-part model elasticity estimate
is -1.6. As with the Tobit IV estimate, these estimates are generally much larger than
those in the literature. However, Eichner (1998) reported a Tobit IV elasticity of -0.8
(the Eichner (1997) elasticity estimates varied from -0.22 to -0.32).
Given the insurance-induced mechanical relationship between price and expendi-
ture, we expect mean elasticity estimates that do not account for endogeneity to be
even larger. To assess the impact of endogeneity on the estimates, I compare the
Tobit IV estimates to Tobit estimates. This comparison is similar to the comparison
of IV to OLS estimates, but it is more appropriate in this context given the censor-
ing and the logarithmic speciﬁcation. As expected, the Tobit estimate that does not
account for endogeneity yields an even larger elasticity estimate of -4.1 with a 95%
conﬁdence interval of -4.2 to -4.0. Censored quantile regression elasticity estimates
that do not account for endogeneity do not exhibit such a large increase in magnitude
relative to CQIV estimates, indicating that endogeneity could have less of an impact
on quantile estimates relative to mean estimates in this context.
As another method of comparison between the CQIV estimates and mean esti-
mates in the literature, I use conservative assumptions to transform the CQIV es-
25timates into a single mean estimate. Assume, based on the CQIV estimates, that
the expenditure elasticity is constant at -2.3 from the .65 quantile to the top of the
expenditure distribution. Since we cannot accurately measure price responsiveness at
other quantiles of the distribution, make the conservative assumption that the true
elasticity at these quantiles is zero, although it is likely to be negative. We obtain
a mean elasticity estimate by weighting the 0 and −2.3 elasticity estimates over all
quantiles as follows: (1 − 0.65) × −2.3 = −0.805. This conservative estimate, which
implies that the true mean elasticity is more negative than −0.805, is still much larger
than the RAND elasticity estimate of −0.2.
In the appendix, I discuss potential diﬀerences between the RAND estimates and
my estimates. In short, the RAND researchers assume a myopic response to price,
and I assume a forward-looking response to price. I provide evidence of forward-
looking behavior in my data, and I provide simulation evidence that suggests that
my estimates would be an order of magnitude smaller if I ignored forward-looking
behavior.
5 Robustness and Speciﬁcation Tests
5.1 Couples Data
Using data beyond my estimation sample, I conduct an indirect test of the exclusion
restriction: one family member’s injury can only aﬀect another family member’s ex-
penditure through its eﬀect on his marginal price. Speciﬁcally, I show that in families
in which cost sharing interactions cannot occur, one family member’s injury does not
appear to be related to another family member’s medical expenditure. At the ﬁrm
that I study, in insurance policies for families of two (“couples”), one family member’s
spending has no mechanical eﬀect on another family member’s marginal price. There-
fore, any eﬀects of one family member’s injury on another family member’s spending
presumably operate through another channel. Although the exclusion restriction is
not an econometrically testable restriction in the main sample of families of four or
more, evidence that there is no eﬀect of one family member’s injury on another family
member’s spending in a family of two supports the validity of the exclusion restriction
in the main sample.








where the regressors are deﬁned above. This speciﬁcation diﬀers from the main
speciﬁcation only in that, in instrumental variable terminology, it examines the re-
duced form eﬀect of the family injury on lnE directly. A traditional instrumental
variable speciﬁcation would not be informative here because the ﬁrst stage cannot
exist in families of two.
I ﬁrst estimate this speciﬁcation on the “couples” sample of 2004 employees in
employee-spouse families of two. Column 7 of Table 2 presents summary statistics on
the couples sample. Comparison with Column 1 shows that the couples population
consists mostly of older “empty nesters” and young couples without children. Fur-
thermore, only 24% of employees in couples consume zero care, as opposed to 36%
in families of four or more. Employees in couples have much higher average expendi-
tures on medical care than their counterparts in families of four or more ($2,883 vs.
$1,485). Given that employees in the couples sample consume more medical care, we
should be more likely to observe spurious eﬀects of other family injuries on spending
in the couples sample than in the family sample. Since the couples sample is much
larger than the family sample, to remove eﬀects of sample size from the comparison,
I conduct the estimation in 100 random subsets of the couples sample of the same
size as the family sample.
The results in speciﬁcation A of Table 5 show that the eﬀect a spouse’s injury on
own expenditure is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. In the 100 random couples
samples taken together, the median point estimate at each quantile is generally not
statistically diﬀerent from zero.
For comparison, I estimate the same speciﬁcation on employees in families of four
or more, where family price interactions can occur. As shown in speciﬁcation B
of Table 5, the coeﬃcients in the family speciﬁcation suggest that employees with
an injured spouse or child spend 0.27 to .45 percent more on their own medical
care. In the family speciﬁcation, the 95% conﬁdence intervals never include zero,
but they do include zero at almost all quantiles in the couples speciﬁcations. In the
couples point estimates shown, even though the point-wise conﬁdence intervals at
the .65 and .75 quantiles do not include zero, a conservative calculation of a uniform
conﬁdence interval over all quantiles would include zero, given that the lower bounds
at these quantiles are already so close to zero. At most quantiles, the entire conﬁdence
27Table 5: Robustness Test: Family Injuries in Couples and Families
Robustness Test:  Family Injuries in Couples and Families
Dependent variable:  Ln(Expenditure)
2004 Sample 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 Tobit
A. Employees in Couples
N= 29,010
+ Family Injury 0.18 0.11 0.20 0.13 0.03 -0.03 -0.08 0.43
     lower bound 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.15 -0.22 -0.30 0.17
     upper bound 0.35 0.29 0.38 0.31 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.69
Includes zero: no yes no yes yes yes yes no
B. Employees in Families of Four or More 
N= 29,010 Family Injury 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.39 0.34 0.27 0.84
     lower bound 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.23 0.16 0.65
     upper bound 0.58 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.52 0.45 0.38 1.02
Includes zero: no no no no no no no no
C. Employees in Families of Four or More - Exluding Employees with Child Injuries
N= 25,884 Family Injury 0.50 0.44 0.48 0.46 0.43 0.34 0.31 0.89
     lower bound 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.50
     upper bound 0.76 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.70 0.58 0.55 1.28
Includes zero: no no no no no no no no
Couple controls:  male dummy, plan (saturated), census region (saturated), salary dummy (vs. 
hourly), count family born 1944 to 1953, count family born 1954 to 1963, count family born 1964 
to 1973, count family born 1974 to 1983, count family born 1984 to 1993.
Family controls:  couple controls, spouse on policy dummy, YOB of oldest dependent, YOB of 
youngest dependent, family size (saturated with 8-11 as one group), count family born 1994 to 
1998, count family born 1999, count family born 2000, count family born 2001, count family born 
2002, count family born 2003, count family born 2004.
+Statistics shown are for a random sample of 29,010 drawn from the full sample of 37,490 
employees in couples.
Censored Quantile Regression
interval for the family point estimates exceeds the entire 95% conﬁdence interval for
the couples. Tobit coeﬃcients, shown in the last row for comparison, do not include
zero in the conﬁdence interval, but they are substantially smaller in the couples
speciﬁcation than they are in the family speciﬁcation. Overall, this comparison lends
strong support to the validity of the exclusion restriction.
One concern with the comparison of the couples speciﬁcation to the family spec-
iﬁcation is that identiﬁcation in the couples speciﬁcation comes only from injures to
spouses, and identiﬁcation in the family speciﬁcation comes from injuries to children
as well as spouses. To address this concern, I drop employees with injured children
from the sample and re-estimate the family speciﬁcation. Relative to the full family
speciﬁcation, I eliminate 3,126 employees with injured children, leaving 760 employees
with injured spouses and 25,124 employees with no family injuries. Even though this
28restricted sample should have less power to produce coeﬃcients statistically diﬀerent
from zero, as shown in speciﬁcation C of Table 5, the conﬁdence intervals do not in-
clude zero at any quantile, further reinforcing the validity of the exclusion restriction
when compared to the couples speciﬁcation. Moreover, the point estimates are sta-
ble across the two family speciﬁcations, suggesting that the identiﬁcation strategy is
robust to the source of the family injuries included in the instrument, an observation
which I investigate more fully in Section 6.1.
5.2 Longitudinal Data
Using longitudinal data, I perform two related exercises: I conduct an indirect test of
the exclusion restriction, and I investigate a potential source of the large magnitudes of
my estimated elasticities. First, if the exclusion restriction holds, one family member’s
injury should only be related to another family member’s spending through price
interactions. The insurance beneﬁts dictate that one family member’s injury cannot
aﬀect another family member’s marginal price in the previous year. Therefore, in
2003, employees with family injuries in 2004 should spend much less than employees
with family injuries in 2003. Accordingly, I examine the reduced form eﬀect of a
family injury in 2004 on expenditure in 2003 in the sample of employees with family
injuries in either year. As in the couples analysis above, I use a censored quantile
speciﬁcation rather than an instrumental variable speciﬁcation because the ﬁrst stage
relationship between a family injury in one year and expenditure in another cannot
exist.
I construct a longitudinal sample of employees in families of four or more in
which every family member is continuously enrolled in 2003 and 2004. I exclude
employees who have injuries themselves in either year, resulting in a sample of 18,743
individuals. In this sample, family injuries have limited persistence across years; only
295 employees have family injuries in both years. I further exclude individuals with
no family injuries in either year and individuals with family injuries in both years,
resulting in an estimation sample of 3,061 individuals.
The coeﬃcients in speciﬁcation A of Table 6 show that employees with family
injuries in 2004 spend less in 2003 than employees with family injuries in 2003. The
coeﬃcients indicate that they spend 7 to 19 percent less across the .65 to .95 quantiles
of the expenditure distribution. The Tobit coeﬃcient in the last column indicates that
mean spending is 18 percent less. The coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant,
likely due to the relatively small sample size.
Second, I estimate a related speciﬁcation that allows me to examine the claim
29Table 6: Robustness Test: Expenditure Across Years
Robustness Test:  Expenditure Across Years
Continuously Enrolled 2003-2004 Employee Sample
Restricted to Employees with Injuries in 2003 or 2004
N= 3,061 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 Tobit
A. Dependent variable:  Ln(Expenditure 2003)
2004 Family Injury Only -0.16 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.12 -0.19 -0.18
     lower bound -0.36 -0.31 -0.35 -0.31 -0.31 -0.35 -0.45 -0.55
     upper bound 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.18
B. Dependent variable:  Ln(Expenditure 2004)
2003 Family Injury Only -0.15 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.08 -0.17
     lower bound -0.39 -0.25 -0.22 -0.35 -0.33 -0.24 -0.31 -0.55
     upper bound 0.09 0.21 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.29 0.16 0.20
People with own injuries in 2003 or 2004 are dropped in both years.
Continuously enrolled 2003-2004 employee sample includes all employees for whom the entire 
family meets the selection criteria for 2003 and 2004.
Censored Quantile Regression
In this estimation sample, 2,042 individuals have a 2003 family injury only and 1,037 individuals 
have a 2004 family injury only.
Controls include (2003 or 2004 values when applicable): male dummy, plan (saturated), census 
region (saturated), salary dummy (vs. hourly), spouse on policy dummy, YOB of oldest 
dependent, YOB of youngest dependent, family size (saturated with 8-11 as one group), count 
family born 1944 to 1953, count family born 1954 to 1963, count family born 1974 to 1983, count 
family born 1984 to 1993, count family born 1994 to 1998, count family born 1999, count family 
born 2000, count family born 2001, count family born 2002, count family born 2003.
that my estimated price elasticity is so large because it captures forward inter-year
shifting of expenditures in response to a family injury. If this explanation is true, in
2004, employees with family injuries in 2003 should spend much less than families
with injuries in 2004. Formally, if inter-year forward shifting occurs, in a related
speciﬁcation that examines the eﬀect of a 2003 family injury on expenditure in 2004,
we expect the coeﬃcients to be more negative than the coeﬃcients at each quantile
in speciﬁcation A, which examines the eﬀect of a 2004 family injury in 2003. How-
ever, the coeﬃcients in speciﬁcation B of Table 6 are, if anything, less negative at
each quantile than the coeﬃcients in speciﬁcation A, but they are not statistically
signiﬁcant. These results are subject to the caveat that without a longer panel, I can-
not rule out forward shifting of expenditure from a multi-year time horizon. Taken
together, the point estimates from both speciﬁcations of Table 6 do not suggest a
violation of the exclusion restriction or forward-shifting of expenditures across years.
306 Additional Speciﬁcations
In this section, I consider variations on the main speciﬁcation that allow me to exam-
ine heterogeneous treatment eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, I examine variation across injuries
to children vs. spouses and variation across inpatient vs. outpatient spending. In
each setting, the variation in the estimates is small relative to the magnitude of the
main estimates.
6.1 Injuries to Spouses vs. Children
In my analysis, there is potential cause for concern if family injuries aﬀect family
income and family income aﬀects expenditure. I cannot control for income directly
because I do not observe it. However, I can informally investigate the role of income
eﬀects by estimating separate speciﬁcations based on injuries to spouses and injuries
to children. If there are large income eﬀects due to the injury of a wage earner,
we might expect an employee’s response to a spouse’s injury to be diﬀerent than an
employee’s response to a child’s injury.
I estimate two variations on the main speciﬁcation: ﬁrst I keep just employees with
child injuries or no family injuries, and second I keep just the employees with spouse
injuries or no family injuries. The second speciﬁcation is similar to Speciﬁcation C
of Table 5, but is an instrumental variables speciﬁcation instead of a reduced form
speciﬁcation. As shown in speciﬁcations B and C of Table 7, the speciﬁcation with just
child injuries gives almost the exact same point estimates as the main speciﬁcation,
which is not surprising given that 4/5 of the injuries in my sample are to children.
The speciﬁcation with just spouse injuries, which is not as well identiﬁed, also yields
point estimates that are the similar in magnitude. This suggests that variation in the
estimates due to child vs. spouse injuries is not large relative to the main elasticity
estimates.
6.2 Outpatient Spending vs. Total Spending
Quantile estimators are less sensitive to extreme values than mean estimators. How-
ever, to be sure that individuals with the highest expenditures are not driving the
results, I estimate the main speciﬁcation at the very highest quantiles, and I estimate
another speciﬁcation which includes only outpatient spending as the dependent vari-
able. Since the potential for cross-substitution is so vast among the medical services
covered by the plans that I study, and there is a great deal of judgment involved in
categorizing diﬀerent types of medical spending, I do not examine expenditure by
31Table 7: Additional Speciﬁcations
Additional Specifications
Dependent variable:  Ln(Expenditure) or Ln(Outpatient Expenditure)
2004 Employee Sample 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 Tobit IV
A. Baseline
N= 29,010 Year-end price -4.34 -4.27 -4.46 -4.52 -4.62 -4.72 -4.58 -6.36
     lower bound -5.15 -5.11 -5.16 -5.06 -5.21 -5.27 -4.98 -7.42
     upper bound -3.30 -3.54 -3.59 -3.95 -4.03 -4.21 -4.17 -5.30
     [Elasticity] -[2.17] -[2.14] -[2.23] -[2.26] -[2.31] -[2.36] -[2.29] -[3.18]
B. Injuries to Children Only
N= 25,386 Year-end price -4.31 -4.23 -4.53 -4.58 -4.65 -4.73 -4.55 -6.28
     lower bound -5.32 -5.15 -5.25 -5.13 -5.22 -5.27 -5.06 -7.38
     upper bound -3.32 -3.18 -3.61 -3.98 -4.07 -4.22 -4.05 -5.17
     [Elasticity] -[2.16] -[2.12] -[2.27] -[2.29] -[2.32] -[2.37] -[2.28] -[3.14]
C. Injuries to Spouses Only
N= 25,884 Year-end price -4.72 -4.36 -4.18 -4.19 -4.30 -4.51 -4.56 -6.80
     lower bound -6.37 -6.07 -5.28 -5.15 -5.52 -5.33 -5.17 -8.95
     upper bound -2.67 -2.94 -2.74 -2.87 -3.02 -3.39 -3.63 -4.64
     [Elasticity] -[2.36] -[2.18] -[2.09] -[2.10] -[2.15] -[2.26] -[2.28] -[3.40]
D. Ln(Outpatient Expenditure)
N= 29,010 Year-end price -4.08 -3.94 -3.97 -4.16 -4.21 -4.48 -4.26 -6.11
     lower bound -4.84 -4.65 -4.67 -4.97 -4.97 -5.01 -4.74 -7.02
     upper bound -3.43 -3.21 -3.30 -3.43 -3.59 -3.98 -3.76 -5.19
     [Elasticity] -[2.04] -[1.97] -[1.99] -[2.08] -[2.10] -[2.24] -[2.13] -[3.05]
96 97 98 99
E. Baseline (Higher Estimated Quantiles)
N= 29,010 Year-end price -4.62 -4.69 -4.80 -4.61
     lower bound -5.10 -5.26 -5.50 -5.63
     upper bound -4.15 -4.20 -4.10 -3.61
     [Elasticity] -[2.31] -[2.35] -[2.40] -[2.31]
Lower and upper bounds of 95% confidence interval from 200 bootstrap replications.
Controls include: employee dummy (when applicable), spouse dummy (when applicable), male 
dummy, plan (saturated), census region (saturated), salary dummy (vs. hourly), spouse on policy 
dummy, YOB of oldest dependent, YOB of youngest dependent, family size (saturated with 8-11 
as one group), count family born 1944 to 1953, count family born 1954 to 1963, count family born 
1974 to 1983, count family born 1984 to 1993, count family born 1994 to 1998, count family born 
1999, count family born 2000, count family born 2001, count family born 2002, count family born 
2003, count family born 2004 (when applicable).
Censored Quantile IV
Censored Quantile IV
therapeutic category. However, I recognize that an important area for future research
is to determine which types of medical spending respond to marginal price. Here,
I separate outpatient expenditure from total expenditure because the Medstat data
32clearly diﬀerentiates inpatient spending from outpatient spending and because RAND
examined both types of spending separately.
Approximately 64% of the sample has some outpatient but no inpatient expen-
diture, and these individuals spend $1,586 on average. In contrast, only 4% of the
sample has some inpatient expenditure, and these individuals spend $9,068 on aver-
age. Even though average spending is large, since such a small fraction of individuals
have inpatient expenditures, it is unlikely that inpatient expenditures drive the CQIV
results. As shown in speciﬁcation E of Table 7, even at very high quantiles where
we expect more inpatient expenditures, the estimated elasticities remain fairly stable
around -2.3. Further, in speciﬁcation D, which includes only outpatient expendi-
tures, the elasticity estimates are not directly comparable because they represent the
elasticity of outpatient expenditures only, but they are generally similar to the main
estimates. It does not appear that the largest expenditures are responsible for the
large magnitude of the main coeﬃcients.
7 Conclusion
This paper makes several contributions. Using recent, detailed data and a rigor-
ous identiﬁcation strategy, I estimate the price elasticity of expenditure on medical
care using a new censored quantile instrumental variables (CQIV) estimator. With
the CQIV estimator, I go beyond standards in the literature by allowing the elastic-
ity estimate to vary with the quantiles of the expenditure distribution, relaxing the
distributional assumptions traditionally used to deal with censoring, and addressing
endogeneity.
I ﬁnd that across the .65 to .95 quantiles of the expenditure distribution, the price
elasticity of expenditure is approximately -2.3. My estimated elasticities are an order
of magnitude larger than those in the literature. I take several steps to compare my
estimates to those in the literature, and I consider several sources of heterogeneity in
the estimates. I conclude that the price elasticity of expenditure on medical care is
much larger than the literature would suggest.
The task for my future research is to understand the welfare consequences of
large price responsiveness. In ongoing research, I develop a structural model of the
price elasticity of expenditure on medical care that is based on insurance-induced
nonlinearities in consumer budget sets, following Hausman (1985). This model allows
me to measure the welfare consequences of price-responsiveness and to examine the
optimal nonlinear design of insurance.
33A Comparison to RAND
A.1 Scope of Comparison
My estimates are an order of magnitude larger than those commonly cited from
the RAND experiment. There could be a multitude of reasons for this discrepancy,
including a possible change in the underlying expenditure elasticity over the decades
between the RAND study and my study and a diﬀerence in behavior between people
in experimental plans and people in actual plans. Here, I examine diﬀerences in
methodology between my estimates and the RAND estimates. (For more background
on the RAND experiment, see Newhouse et. al 1983.)
Below I discuss the calculation of the RAND estimates of the price elasticity of
expenditure on medical care. I emphasize that the RAND methodology assumes a
myopic response to contemporaneous marginal price, and my methodology assumes a
forward-looking response to year-end marginal price. Next, I present simple sugges-
tive evidence of forward-looking behavior among the individuals in my data. Lastly,
I conduct a simulation in my data under conditions intended to mimic the plans and
assumptions of the RAND experiment. The simulation shows that by assuming my-
opia when some individuals are forward-looking, it is possible to estimate an elasticity
that is an order of magnitude smaller than the true elasticity.
A.2 Review of RAND estimates
To induce subjects to participate in the RAND experiment, researchers had to guar-
antee that participants would be subject to very low out-of-pocket costs, so all plans
in the experiment had a yearly stoploss of $1,000 or less in 1974-1982 dollars. Fur-
thermore, each year, all families were given lump sum payments that equaled or
exceeded their out-of-pocket payments. The experimenters randomized families into
plans with initial marginal prices of 0%, 25%, 50%, 95%, but after family spending
reached the stoploss, marginal price was zero for the rest of the year, regardless of
plan. In practice, the stoploss was binding for a large fraction (roughly 20%) of par-
ticipants. Approximately 35% of individuals in the least generous plan exceeded the
stoploss, as did approximately 70% of individuals with any inpatient care. To put
these rates in a broader context, less than 4% of individuals met the stoploss in my
non-experimental data.
RAND researchers recognized that the stoploss aﬀected their ability to calculate
the price elasticity of expenditure on medical care based on the experimentally ran-
domized prices:
34“In order to compare our results with those in the literature, how-
ever, we must extrapolate to another part of the response surface, namely,
the response to coinsurance variation when there is no maximum dollar
expenditure. Although any such extrapolation is hazardous (and of lit-
tle practical relevance given the considerable departure from optimality
of such an insurance policy), we have undertaken such an extrapolation
rather than forego entirely any comparison with the literature.” (Manning
et al. (1987), page 267)
Manning et al. (1987) cited three sources of estimates of the price elasticity of ex-
penditure on medical care in the RAND data, the most prominent of which was based
on a simulation by Keeler and Rolph (1988) and not on the Manning et al. (1987)
four-part model. Keeler and Rolph (1988) recognized that a comparison of year-
end expenditures based on the experimentally induced coinsurance rates across plans
could be misleading because behavior was inﬂuenced by stoplosses. They therefore
used the experimental data to simulate year-end-expenditures in hypothetical plans
without stoplosses, and they based their elasticity estimates on this simulated be-
havior. To conduct the simulation, they assumed myopic responses to marginal price
and examined the frequency of visits for all participants in the period for which their
families still had over $400 remaining before meeting the stoploss. Notably, they in-
cluded people in families that far exceeded the stoploss in the simulation. Based on
calibrated parametric assumptions on the frequency of visits by type and the cost per
visit by type, they forecasted year-end expenditures, and they compared forecasted
expenditures across coinsurance plans relative to the free plan to attain their elasticity
estimates using the following midpoint arc elasticity formula:
ηmidpoint =
(e1 − e2)/(e1 + e2)
(p1 − p2)/(p1 + p2)
(3)
where p denotes the coinsurance rate and e denotes simulated expenditures. The
often-cited RAND elasticity estimate of -0.22 comes from a comparison of predicted
expenditures across plans with 95% and 25% coinsurance rates as follows:
ηRAND =
(71 − 55)/(71 + 55)
(25 − 95)/(25 + 95)
≈ −0.22 (4)
Similar calculations based on the predictions from the four-part model and the
experimental means yield estimates of -0.14 and -0.17, respectively. The 95% to 25%
price change that forms the basis for this arc elasticity should be roughly comparable
35to the price change on which I base my arc elasticities - from 100% before the de-
ductible to the 20% coinsurance rate. One key methodological diﬀerence, however, is
that I use within-plan price variation instead of across-plan price variation. Another
key diﬀerence between the RAND methodology and my methodology comes from the
underlying treatment of myopia vs. foresight.
A.3 Evidence of Foresight
In the simple model of medical care expenditure on which I base my analysis, the
most important parameter is the year-end marginal price. According to the model,
if an individual expects to meet the stoploss by the end of the year, he will consume
medical care all year as if his marginal price is zero, and expenditures paid at the
randomized marginal rate will induce only an income eﬀect. In contrast, by forecast-
ing expenditures based on expenditure patterns before the stoploss is met, the Keeler
and Rolph (1988) analysis assumes a strong form of myopia.
To investigate the validity of the myopia assumption, I conduct a simple test for
forward-looking behavior in my data: if individuals are forward-looking, individuals
who do not expect to meet the deductible should change their intra-year pattern
of expenditures when a family injury occurs, but individuals who expect to meet
the deductible should not. To examine people who plausibly expected to meet the
deductible in 2004 regardless of a family injury, I identify individuals whose 2003 own
spending exceeded the 2003 individual deductible as “High 2003.” I identify all other
individuals as “Low 2003”. I restrict the sample to people with family injuries in
2004, and I compare average monthly expenditures before and after the month of the
ﬁrst family injury within these two spending categories. As in the main estimation
sample, I exclude individuals with own injuries. I also omit individuals whose ﬁrst
family injuries occur in January or December so that it is always possible to observe
spending before and after the family injury.
The top panel of Figure A1 presents the results from the sample of 2,265 employees
with 2004 family injuries and complete 2003 expenditure data. (This sample is larger
than the sample of employee with 2004 family injuries in Table 6 because I do not
require the full family to be continuously enrolled in 2003.) A comparison of the
two bars on the left to the two bars on the right shows that individuals with high
2003 spending spend more on average in 2004, regardless of the timing of the family
injury. Within each set of bars, the comparisons provide evidence of forward-looking
behavior. As expected, the left set of bars shows that employees with low 2003
spending spend more on average after the family injury than they did before the
36family injury. Also as expected, the right set of bars shows that employees with high
2003 spending do not appear to alter their spending patterns in response to the timing
of a family injury.
Formally, neither diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. However, in the bottom
panel, when I use the entire sample instead of just the employees, low spenders also
spend more on average after the injury, and the diﬀerence in means is statistically
signiﬁcant for low 2003 spenders (t=-2.74) and is not statistically signiﬁcant for high
2003 spenders (t=.4748). When I formalize this comparison of means using a Tobit
model for the logarithm of expenditures, I ﬁnd that low 2003 spenders spend 16%
more after injuries in 2004 relative to high 2003 spenders, but this estimate is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
The question of whether consumers are myopic or forward-looking is complicated
and interesting in its own right, and it should be investigated more completely. How-
ever, this test provides suggestive evidence against the Keeler and Rolph (1988) as-
sumption of myopia. If consumers are forward-looking, it is problematic to assume
that the initial statutory marginal price ever governs behavior of participants who
expect to meet the stoploss, even in the period before the stoploss is met. Includ-
ing these participants in the simulation should bias estimates of price responsiveness
downward because variation across plans will be less pronounced among participants
who expect to meet the stoploss and thus do not respond to at all to the statutory
marginal price. Furthermore, participants with the highest coinsurance rates are more
likely than participants with the lowest coinsurance rates to meet the stoploss, and
thus they are more likely to behave as if care is free, which further attenuates elasticity
estimates toward zero. The lack of experimental price variation among the highest
spenders is unfortunate because, given the skewness in the distribution of medical
expenditure, the price responsiveness of the highest spenders is very policy-relevant.
A.4 Simulation Exercise
To calculate expenditure elasticities, Keeler and Rolph (1988) simulated the expen-
diture response to plans with a higher stoploss than the true stoploss in their data.
To illustrate potential bias in the Keeler and Rolph (1988) methodology, I conduct a
theoretical reverse of the RAND exercise, in which I simulate the response to plans
with lower stoplosses than the true stoplosses in my data. One advantage of my
simulation over the RAND simulation is that it leads to within-sample predictions,
whereas the RAND simulation led to out-of-sample predictions.
Since the RAND simulation included people who faced a zero eﬀective year-end
37marginal price but attributed their behavior to a nonzero statutory marginal price, the
RAND estimates should be biased toward zero. In my simulation, I simulate behavior
governed by a zero eﬀective marginal price, but I attribute this behavior to a nonzero
statutory marginal price in the estimates, and I demonstrate the magnitude of the
resulting bias toward zero. Under assumptions intended to mimic the conditions of
the RAND experiment in my simulation, I estimate a simulated elasticity that is an
order of magnitude smaller than the true elasticity.
The simulation steps are as follows:
1. Estimate the following speciﬁcation using my data and my methodology:
lnE = αP + W
0β + u (5)
where all variables are deﬁned as above. Retain estimates for subsequent steps.
In practice, I estimate my model in my data using Tobit IV, and I estimate
a price elasticity of -3.2. I do not use CQIV for this simulation because I am
interested in a mean estimate for comparison to RAND.
2. Predict log expenditure for all individuals using the estimated coeﬃcients and
the empirical values of P and X:
d lnE = b αP + W
0b β (6)
3. To mimic the spending response to a new, lower stoploss than that in the
actual plans, choose a group of individuals for whom the new stoploss will be
low enough that they will reasonably expect to meet it. Calibrate the size of
this group according to the percentage of individuals who met the stoploss in
the RAND study. For this group, compute a simulated predicted expenditure,
which assumes an eﬀective marginal price of zero, even though the nominal
year-end marginal price for these individuals in the actual plans is often non-
zero:
g lnE = b α ∗ 0 + W
0b β (7)
Since b α < 0 and P ≥ 0, it follows that g lnE > d lnE. This makes intuitive sense
because, given downward sloping demand, people who face a price of zero will
spend more on medical care than they would if they faced a nonzero marginal
price. For example, in the data, there is an individual who faces a year-end
nominal marginal price of 0.2, and has total year-end spending of $927. Based
38on his nominal marginal price and the values of his values of W, his predicted
log spending is 5.7244, which by exponentiation, translates into $306.25. In the
simulation, when I predict his log spending based on a year-end eﬀective price
of zero, the new predicted value is 6.997, which by exponentiation, translates
into $1,093.
4. Re-estimate the price elasticity using my methodology on the data set of pre-
dicted expenditures and nominal marginal prices, and compare it to the “true”
elasticity as computed by the price coeﬃcient b α, estimated in the ﬁrst step.
To determine whose expenditures to alter in the third step, I examine expendi-
tures on the family level because the RAND stoplosses were on the family level. Since
approximately 20% of subjects met the stoploss in the RAND study, I place approx-
imately 20% of my sample into in hypothetical plans in which the eﬀective marginal
price is zero. Speciﬁcally, this subset includes 6,015 people with no family injuries
whose total family spending exceeds $5,500 (20.7% of the entire sample, and 23.9%
of the sample with no family injuries).
It is plausible that families without injuries whose expenditures exceed $5,500
would have met the $1,000 stoploss in the RAND plans, even accounting for over-
all and medical inﬂation. In the least generous plan in my data, when family total
beneﬁciary plus insurer spending is $5,500, beneﬁciary spending is $3,000+($5,500-
$3,000)*0.2=$3,500. Similarly, in the most generous plan in my data, when family to-
tal beneﬁciary plus insurer spending is $5,500, beneﬁciary spending is $1,050+($5,500-
$1,050)*0.2= $1,940. In my data, since the stoplosses are so much higher than they
were in the RAND experiment, very small numbers of individuals meet the stoploss.
Among the individuals whose expenditures I alter, the average statutory marginal
price is .4 (29.4% at 1, 52.6% at 0.2, and 14.6% at 0).
When I re-estimate the model in the fourth step using predicted expenditures
and nominal marginal prices, I estimate a price elasticity of -.34, which is an order
of magnitude smaller than the original estimate of -3.2. It is possible to alter the
expenditures of other plausibly-sized subsets of individuals to yield similar results.
For example, when I alter the spending of a random 15% of individuals with no family
injuries, I estimate a price elasticity of -.33. In addition, when I alter the spending of
a random 50% of individuals with family spending that exceeds $2,000 and no family
injuries, I estimate a price elasticity of -0.28. The results of these simulation exercises
suggest that if plausibly-sized groups of individuals are forward-looking, but they are
assumed to be myopic, estimates of the price elasticity of expenditure on medical care
could reﬂect a substantial bias toward zero.
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41Figure A1: 2004 Mean Monthly Expenditure






















Low 2003 Expenditure High 2003 Expenditure
Sample includes 2,265  employees.
Paired t test statistics before vs. after:  Low 2003: t=−1.17  High 2003: t=.11.
Employees
Mean(Expenditure Before /# Months Before)






















Low 2003 Expenditure High 2003 Expenditure
Sample includes 9,075  individuals.
Paired t test statistics before vs. after:  Low 2003: t=−2.74  High 2003: t=−.47.
Everyone
Mean(Expenditure Before /# Months Before)
Mean (Expenditure After/# Months After)
Only people with first family injuires from February−November are included.
Expenditure during month of first family injury omitted.
2004 Mean Monthly Expenditure
Before and After First Family Injury
42Table A1: 2003 Summary Statistics
2003 Summary Statistics
Cells report column % by variable
Employees Everyone








Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Year-end Expenditure ($)
0 36.8 40.7 38.0 28.7 41.9 31.6
.01 to 100.00 11.4 12.5 11.4 11.4 12.5 12.2
100.01 to 1,000 31.1 31.7 30.7 34.4 31.1 36.2
1,000.01 to 10,000 17.8 13.3 17.2 22.3 12.7 17.5
10,000.01 to 100,000 2.8 1.8 2.7 3.3 1.7 2.4
100,000.01 and up 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
B. Year-end Price
0 3.4 2.5 3.1 5.3 2.2 4.8
0.2 37.5 31.6 35.8 49.4 29.8 44.9
1 59.1 65.9 61.1 45.3 68.0 50.3
C. Family Injury
0 (NO Family Injury) 87.7 88.3 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
1 (Family Injury) 12.3 11.7 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
D. Family Size
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 66.1 59.2 67.2 58.1 60.5 49.3
5 24.9 27.9 24.3 29.0 27.4 32.1
6 6.8 9.1 6.4 9.5 8.6 12.8
7 1.7 2.6 1.5 2.4 2.4 3.9
8 to 12 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.9
E. Relation to Employee
Employee 100.0 22.7 100.0 100.0 22.5 23.9
Spouse 0.0 18.8 0.0 0.0 18.7 19.9
Child/Other 0.0 58.5 0.0 0.0 58.8 56.2
F. Male
0 (Female) 43.4 50.1 43.4 43.1 50.1 50.2
1 (Male) 56.6 49.9 56.6 56.9 49.9 49.8
G. Year of Birth
1934 to 1943 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
1944 to 1953 4.7 2.1 4.8 4.4 2.1 2.0
1954 to 1963 33.9 14.1 34.0 33.3 14.0 14.6
1964 to 1973 50.2 20.0 50.0 51.5 19.8 21.6
1974 to 1983 10.9 6.7 11.0 10.6 6.7 6.8
1984 to 1993 0.0 30.4 0.0 0.0 30.5 29.8
1994 to 1998 0.0 15.5 0.0 0.0 15.6 14.8
1999 to 2003 0.0 11.0 0.0 0.0 11.4 10.2
H. Employee Class
Salary Non-union 29.4 29.8 29.4 29.5 29.9 29.0
Hourly Non-union 70.6 70.2 70.6 70.5 70.1 71.0
I. US Census Region
New England 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.7
Middle Atlantic 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5
East North Central 15.5 15.6 15.4 16.7 15.5 16.9
West North Central 12.3 12.2 11.8 15.4 11.9 15.1
South Atlantic 18.5 18.4 19.2 13.5 19.1 13.2
East South Central 10.8 10.7 10.7 11.3 10.6 11.7
West South Central 29.1 29.1 29.2 28.7 29.2 28.5
Mountain 7.8 8.0 7.7 8.4 7.9 8.7
Pacific 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.8
J. Plan by Individual Deductible
350 63.4 63.4 62.7 68.8 62.7 69.0
500 17.1 17.0 17.4 15.6 17.2 15.4
750 5.7 5.6 5.8 4.5 5.8 4.2
1000 13.8 13.9 14.1 11.0 14.2 11.4
Sample Size 29,886 131,815 26,201 3,685 116,393 15,422
Everyone Employees
Families of Four or More
43Table A2: CQIV Coeﬃcients on Selected Covariates
CQIV Coefficients on Selected Covariates
Dependent variable:  Ln(Expenditure)
N= 29,010
2004 Employee Sample 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 Tobit IV
Year-end price -4.34 -4.27 -4.46 -4.52 -4.62 -4.72 -4.58 -6.36
     lower bound -5.15 -5.11 -5.16 -5.06 -5.21 -5.27 -4.98 -7.42
     upper bound -3.30 -3.54 -3.59 -3.95 -4.03 -4.21 -4.17 -5.30
     [Elasticity] -[2.17] -[2.14] -[2.23] -[2.26] -[2.31] -[2.36] -[2.29] -[3.18]
Control Term -0.31 -0.24 0.03 0.16 0.37 0.53 0.44 NA
     lower bound -1.32 -0.99 -0.79 -0.42 -0.19 0.02 0.02 NA
     upper bound 0.54 0.60 0.74 0.71 0.95 1.11 0.81 NA
Male -0.25 -0.22 -0.17 -0.12 -0.05 0.01 0.06 -0.64
     lower bound -0.42 -0.39 -0.36 -0.22 -0.17 -0.10 -0.02 -0.85
     upper bound -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.13 0.15 -0.43
$500 Deduct 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.29 0.28 0.23
     lower bound 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.07
     upper bound 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.39
Pacific 0.21 0.23 0.35 0.28 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.15
     lower bound -0.22 -0.05 -0.05 -0.14 -0.17 -0.11 -0.07 -0.26
     upper bound 0.65 0.54 0.68 0.75 0.48 0.42 0.44 0.57
Salaried Subscriber 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.31
     lower bound 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.21
     upper bound 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.41
Spouse on Policy 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 0.04
     lower bound -0.16 -0.24 -0.20 -0.21 -0.23 -0.21 -0.17 -0.24
     upper bound 0.30 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.32
YOB of Oldest Dependent -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
     lower bound -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
     upper bound 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
YOB of Youngest Dependen 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
     lower bound -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
     upper bound 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Family Size of 8 to 11 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.71 1.34 1.52 1.70 2.06
     lower bound -1.19 -0.80 -1.19 -1.47 -1.36 -0.16 0.40 -0.29
     upper bound 2.10 2.28 2.57 3.07 3.45 3.26 3.48 4.42
Count family born 2004 0.56 0.46 0.29 0.11 -0.12 -0.27 -0.39 -0.57
     lower bound 0.07 -0.01 -0.24 -0.32 -0.53 -0.57 -0.79 -1.16
     upper bound 0.95 0.78 0.68 0.57 0.39 0.09 -0.09 0.02
Intercept 16.30 16.72 22.74 24.74 24.26 24.72 25.84 5.73
     lower bound -21.81 -19.33 -11.34 -2.89 -5.08 0.67 6.09 -43.28
     upper bound 55.07 52.59 55.38 52.12 53.84 51.33 47.74 54.75
Lower and upper bounds of 95% confidence interval from 200 bootstrap replications.
Omitted categories in estimation: $350 Deduct, Family Size of 4, Northeast, count family born 
1934 to 1943.
Omitted catgories from table: $750 Deduct, $1000 Deduct, Family Size of 5, Family Size of 6, 
Family Size of 7, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East 
South Central, West South Central, Mountain, count family born 1944 to 1953, count family 
born 1954 to 1963, count family born 1974 to 1983, count family born 1984 to 1993, count 
family born 1994 to 1998, count family born 1999, count family born 2000, count family born 
2001, count family born 2002, count family born 2003.
Censored Quantile IV
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